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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT 
Nos . 85-6052 and 6097 
(consolidated) 
ANN B. HOPKINS 
Appellant - Cross Appellee, 
v . 
PRICE WATERHOUSE 
Appellee - Cross Appellant . 
Appeals from the United States District Court 
for the District of Columbia 
CERTIFICATE REQUIRED BY RULE S(c) 
OF THE GENERAL RULES OF THE 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT 
The undersigned, counsel of record of Price 
Waterhouse, certifies that the following listed parties 
appeared in the court below: 
1. Ann B. Hopkins ; 
2. Price Waterhouse . 
Price Waterhouse seeks reversal of the district 
court's ruling that Price Waterhouse violated Title VII of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1964. In the alternative, Price Waterhouse 
seeks affirmance of the district court's ruling that plaintiff 
is not entitled to relief other than attorneys' fees. 
Ann B. Hopkins seeks affirmance of the district 
court's judgment as to liability but seeks to have its ruling 
as to remedy vacated and remanded for the entry of further 
relief . 
These representations are made in order that the 
judges of this Court, inter alia may evaluate possible 
disqualification or recusal . 
Davidson Ir. 
At 9 ney of Record 
,/ 
for Appellee-Cross Appellant 
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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT 
Nos. 85-6052 and 6097 
(consolidated) 
ANN B. HOPKINS 
Appellant - Cross Appellee, 
v. 
PRICE WATERHOUSE 
Appellee - Cross Appellant. 
Appeals from the United States District Court 
for the District of Columbia 
BRIEF ~OR APPELLEE - CROSS APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF ISSUE PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. May a violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights 
Act of 1964 be established where there is no finding (a) that 
the defendant partnership intentionally discriminated against 
the plaintiff employee because of her sex in deferring her 
admission to the pa~tnership, or (b) that any discrimination 
that may have occurred (in the unconscious use of sex 
stereotypes) had any causal effect on that decision. 
2. Are the district court's findings concerning the 
existence and role of unconscious sex stereotyping in the 
comments about plaintiff by unspecified partners clearly 
erroneous? 
RULE 8(b) STATEMENT 
This case was tried in the United States District 
Court for the District of Columbia as Hopkins v. Price 
Waterhouse, No. 84-3040. A related case between these two 
parties, brought under the District of Columbia Human Rights 
Act, D.C. Code § 1-2501 et~-, is pending in the Superior 
Court of the District of Columbia (Civil Division), styled 
Hopkins v. Price Waterhouse, No. 3469-84. 
STATUTE INVOLVED 
The gov erning statute in this case is Title VII of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C . §§ 2000e et 
~ The provisions of this statute pertinent to this appeal 
are included in the Appendix hereto. 
REFERENCES TO PARTIES AND RULINGS 
The United States District Court for the District of 
Columbia (Judge Gesell) entered a Memorandum and Order herein 
on September 20, 1985. The Memorandum appears at page 7 of the 
Record Excerpts submitted to this Court by Appellant - Cross 
Appellee (hereinafter RE). The Order appears at RE 35. The 
decision is reported at 618 F. Supp. 1109 (D.D.C. 1985). 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Plaintiff was a Senior Manager with the partnership of 
Price Waterhouse (the "firm"). In 1982, the partners of 
plaintiff's local office, the Office of Government Services 
("OGS"), proposed her for admission to the partnership in July 
1983.il_/ The firm's Policy Board, however, decided to defer 
for at least one year any final vote on whether to admit 
plaintiff to the partnership, a decision also reached as to 19 
male candidates that year. The Policy Board's decision to 
"hold" plaintiff's 1983 candidacy was primarily based on 
complaints received during the admissions process concerning 
plaintiff's interpersonal behavior. These complaints were 
l/ During t he annual admissions process, the partners in each 
Price Water house office propose conditates for partnership, and 
every partner in the firm is invited to submit either a long or 
short form appraisal on any candidate about whom he or she has 
relevant information. The long form is meant to be prepared 
for candidates with whom the partner has had a "major direct 
client or project relationship during the past 3 or so years." 
The short form is to be used for commenting upon any other 
candidates about whom the partner believes meaningful 
information can be supplied. 
The evaluations are reviewed in the first instance by the 
members of the Admissions Committee of the Policy Board of the 
firm, which manages the firm. The members of the Admissions 
Committee then further investigate the evaluations by way of 
personal visits to the candidates' offices, and then meet to 
decide upon recommendations as to whether each candidate should 
be admitted, held, or rejected. The Committee reports its 
recommendations in this regard to the full Policy Board, which 
determines which candidates will appear on the partnership 
b a 11 o t . ( See RE 8- 10 . ) 
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reported by most partners who submitted an evaluation on 
plaintiff's candidacy . 
In 1983, the partners of OGS decided not to repropose 
plaintiff as a candidate for admission in July 1984. This 
decision was heavily influenced by the opposition of two OGS 
partners who expressed substantial and continuing concerns 
about plaintiff's interpersonal behavior and her management 
style. (RE 12 & 15-17.) Both partners had expressed these 
concerns in the long form evaluations they submitted in 
response to the pla i ntiff ' s candidacy in 1982. One of these 
partners had since that time also developed reservations about 
plaintiff's technical skills as a result of a review he had 
conducted of a project plaintiff that managed. (RE 15-17 . ) 
When plaintiff was informed of the 1983 decision by 
the partners of OGS not to repropose her, she was also told 
that she still had a slim chance of being proposed for 
partnership in the future and that the firm wanted her to 
remain in its employ . 
remain with the firm. 
Several partners encouraged her to 
(RE 32.) Plaintiff, however, chose to 
terminate her employment contract and to resign to pursue 
consulting engagements as an independent contractor. (RE 6-7.) 
A. Plaintiff's Claims And The District Court's Ultimate 
Findings. 
The trial of this case involved claims of intentional 
sex discrimination brought under Title VII of the Civil Rights 
Act of 1964, as amended. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e et~ The 
4 
plaintiff alleged (1) that the decision by the Policy Board to 
hold her candidacy was motivated by consideration of her sex; 
(2) that the decision by OGS partners not to repropose her 
candidacy was a product of sex discrimination; and (3) that her 
resignation was in fact a constructive discharge compelled by 
the OGS decision not to repropose her candidacy. 
The district court found that the Policy Board 
decision to hold plaintiff's candidacy was influenced by 
discrimination; that the subsequent OGS decision not to 
repropose plaintiff was untainted by any discrimination; and 
that the plaintiff had not established a constructive 
discharge. Price Waterhouse appeals herein the district 
court's finding that the Policy Board decision was a product of 
discrimination. Plaintiff appeals the court's decision on her 
constructive discharge claim. Plaintiff does not appeal the 
finding that the decision by the OGS partners not to repropose 
her candidacy following the hold decision by the Policy Board 
was untainted by sex discrimination. 
B. Review Of The District Court's Subsidiary Findings And The 
Evidence Respecting The Decision By The Policy Board To 
Hold Plaintiff's Candidacy. 
As noted, the decision by the Policy Board to hold 
plaintiff's candidacy was based upon complaints it received 
du~ing the admissions process concerning her interpersonal 
behavior. During the course of her employment as a Senior 
Manager, plaintiff repeatedly experienced significant 
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difficulties in her dealings with the professional staff 
members whom she supervised. The partners of OGS who proposed 
plaintiff and supported her admission recognized this and were 
concerned that plaintiff's interpersonal skills or operational 
style would generate negative comments once plaintiff's 
candidacy was submitted to the partners for comment in the 
partner canvass. This concern was reflective of a 
long-standing view, frequently noted in plaintiff's performance 
evaluations and annual counselling sessions, that her manner of 
dealing with people had a tendency to generate substantial 
ill-will and hostility .fl/ 
The concerns of the OGS partners about likely 
~ criticisms regarding plaintiff's interpersonal skills were not 
~/ The district court found that: "[c]ontemporaneous records 
of counseling sessions and evaluations conducted well before 
the plaintiff was proposed for partnership indicate that 
partners found her too assertive, overly critical of others, 
impatient with her staff, and counselled her to soften her 
image." (RE 15.) The records of the counselling sessions and 
performance evaluations to which the district court refers 
contain observations (a) that plaintiff "understood that some 
people believed that she was hard to work with;" (b) that she 
"agreed that she should be careful with her language - not just 
avoiding profanity, but also guarding against unprofessional 
language and expressions;" (c) that she had a "tendency toward 
direct confrontation of a problem or issue, often without 
sufficient consideration of the personnel involved;" (d) that 
"this approach. [was] often perceived as a threat to less 
secure individuals;" (e) that she [needed] to be patient with 
superiors who [were] slower than she [was];" (f) that she was 
"sometimes overly critical of people's work;" (g) that she was 
"sometimes overly assertive [and] must be more tolerant of 
others who [were] not as gifted;" and (h) that she needed a 
"greater focus on staff development. 11 (Def. Exhs. 11, 13, 14 & 
1 7. ) 
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trivial. The partners were well aware that the Policy Board 
took seriously any complaints about interpersonal behavior 
submitted during the admissions process. 
found: 
As the district court 
[O)ver the years the firm has consistently 
placed a high premium on candidates' ability 
to deal with subordinates and peers on an 
interpersonal basis and to promote cordial 
relations within a firm which is necessarily 
dependent on team effort. Not only are 
candidates regularly held because of 
concerns about their interpersonal skills 
the Policy Board takes any evaluations 
recommending denial of partnership or a 
negative reaction on this basis very 
seriously. 
(RE 19.) The court further found: 
(RE 14.) 
The interpersonal skills of prospective partners was 
properly an important part of Price Waterhouse's 
written partnership evaluation criteria. Inability to 
get along with staff or peers is a legitimate, 
nondiscriminatory reason for refusing to admit a 
candidate to partnership. 
As it turned out, plaintiff's undisputedly deficient 
interpersonal behavior provoked widespread opposition to her 
candidacy for admission in 1983. The partners reported to the 
Policy Board that she alienated the staff members with whom she 
worked, and was abrasive, overbearing, arrogant, self centered, 
annoying and irritating. (Def. Exh. 27.) In light of the 
extent of this concern, several members of the Policy Board 
concluded that plaintiff should be informed that she would not 
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become a partner. (Connor Dep. 29-30, 43 & 72; Tr. 267-69 & 
312-13 . ) Other partners convinced them that she should be 
"afford[ed] time to demonstrate that she has the personal and 
leadership qualities required of a partner," and her candidacy 
was placed on hold. (Id.; Def. Exh. 37.) Thus, she remained 
eligible for proposal by her local office the next year or 
thereafter. 
After extensive discovery and a four-and-one-half-day 
trial, during which time the district court had an opportunity 
to observe plaintiff and to hear her testimony and the 
testimony of partners and staff professionals of the firm, the 
court held that the complaints about plaintiff's interpersonal 
behavior upon which the Policy Board based its decision were 
true and correct. Indeed , the court expressly found that 
''[p]laintiff's conduct provided ample justification for the 
complaints that formed the basis of the Policy Board's 
decision" and that "plaintiff had considerable problems dealing 
with staff and peers." (RE 15 & 31) (emphasis added.) 
The court further found that the Policy Board treated 
plaintiff no differently than it treated male candidates whose 
interpersonal skills were unacceptable. (RE 17-21.) The court 
found that "the fir~ has consistently placed a high premium on 
candidates' ability to deal with subordinates and peers," and 
that the Policy Board "regularly held" candidates because of 
concerns about their interpersonal skills. ( RE 19. ) 
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: 
Having found that the plaintiff was, among other 
things, rude, insensitive, unduly harsh, and difficult to work 
with, and that the Policy Board fairly took this into account 
in exercising caution and holding her candidacy, the court 
nevertheless proceeded to impose liability upon Price 
Waterhouse under a novel theory . Under this theory, the Policy 
Board was not entitled to rely upon the comments criticizing 
the plaintiff's interpersonal skills in determining whether she 
should be admitted, even though the comments were "amply" 
justified by her admittedly unacceptable behavior. According 
to the district court, Title VII imposed upon the Policy Board 
the obligation to somehow discount criticisms of plaintiff 
because they may have been influenced by a phenomenon the court 
called "sex stereotyping." 
The term as used by the court here does not connote 
the kind of stereotyping with which courts have dealt 
previously in Title VII cases. In those other cases, employers 
were held to have unlawfully stereotyped when they excluded 
members of a protected group from consideration for positions 
on the basis of a negative generalization that all members of 
that group were unqualified . For example, one employer 
violated Title VII when it rejected a female employee's 
application for a promotion to a police officer position on the 
basis of a stereotyped assumption that females were not 
physically capable of doing that work. See Thorne v. City of 
9 
El Segundo, 726 F.2d 459 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 105 
S. Ct. 380 (1984). 
The form of stereotyping that the district court 
found operative in this case does not involve the negative 
stereotypes described above. In fact, the court's excursion 
into the field of stereotyping began with positive stereotypes 
of men and women. In society in general, the theory goes, 
there are different stereotyped expectations for the behavior 
of men and women. Men supposedly are expected to behave in a 
combative, assertive and aggressive fashion, and women are 
expected to be tender, understanding and concerned. 
When (again in society in general) a woman engages in 
behavior which is under any test unacceptable but which also 
runs counter to the stereotyped expectations for the behavior 
of women, those holding such stereotypes might react more 
harshly to the unacceptable behavior. The tendency to so react 
is supposedly heightened when the evaluator has only limited 
contact with females and in particular with the female being 
evaluated. 
The court applied this theory to plaintiff's situation 
as follows. Plaintiff engaged in behavior that was 
unacceptable for males or females, ~, she was rude, overly 
critical, impatient with staff, and unduly harsh. As a female, 
however, this offensive behavior also ran counter to that of 
the stereotype for her group, the members of which are 
supp0sedly expected by some members of society to be tender and 
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concerned. Therefore, those with limited contact with her 
(~, those who completed "short forms") may have somehow 
unconsciously exaggerated or overreacted to the still 
undisputedly unacceptable behavior.fl/ 
The evidence presented by plaintiff in support of the 
theory the court adopted was limited to the testimony of 
Dr . Susan Fiske, a social psychologist.~/ Although she 
testified at length about the phenomenon of stereotyping in 
general, she could reach only a limited conclusion as to its 
operation in plaintiff's particular situation. As the court 
noted, 
Dr. Fiske did not purport to be able to 
determine whether or not any particular 
reaction was determined by the operation of 
3/ Since the court found complaints about plaintiff's 
Interpersonal skills to be well founded, the district court's 
analysis of this "stereotyping" argument must have been solely 
one of degree. It was this supposed extra degree of intensity 
allegedly prompted by an adverse reaction to plaintiff's 
counter-stereotypical conduct coupled with the allegation that 
the Policy Board should have recognized and addressed this risk 
which plaintiff claimed formed the basis for a finding of 
discrimination under Title VII. 
1/ Plaintiff introduced this wholly new and different claim of 
discrimination late in the trial, in what she characterized as 
a rebuttal presentation. This claim had not been disclosed in 
discovery (Def. Exh. 76) and did not in any sense seek to rebut 
or to demonstrate the pretexuality of the reasons offered by 
Price Waterhouse to explain the Policy Board decision. Indeed, 
this last minute claim effectively conceded that the reasons 
for the Policy Board's decision were not invented to hide an 
intent to discriminate. Dr. Fiske's improper rebuttal 
testimony was erroneously admitted over the objection of Price 
Waterhouse. (Tr. 539. ) See VI Wigmore on Evidence § 1873 
(Chadbourne rev. 1976). 
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( RE 23. ) 
sex stereotypes. However, she did identify 
comments that she believed were influenced 
by sex stereotypes. Dr. Fiske stated that 
in her opinion unfavorable comments by male 
partners, slanted in a negative direction by 
operation of male stereotyping, were a major 
factor in the firm's evaluation of the 
plaintiff. But she could not pinpoint the 
degree to which stereotyping had influenced 
the selection process. 
Dr. Fiske therefore could not identify those who 
overreacted to plaintiff's unacceptable behavior or the degree, 
if any, to which such overreactions affected the decision to 
"hold."L:'2/ This was not surprising, since plaintiff presented 
no evidence concerning the individual negative short form 
~ / Dr . Fiske's conclusions are further subject to question 
because of the faulty assumptions upon which they are based. 
For example , Dr. Fiske used the concept of "rarity" to advance 
the notion that plaintiff was judged more harshly because she 
was the only female candidate proposed that year. By 
necessity, however, the perceptions of the partners were based 
upon her conduct as a Senior Manager, not as a partnership 
candidate, and women are not rare in the Senior Manager ranks. 
Dr. Fiske also relied on the fact that the negative comments 
about plaintiff were "extreme," but she did not make a complete 
review of all the admissions materials that were available to 
her. If she had, she would have found that comments that she 
might consider extreme are common in the admissions process . 
(Def. Exh. 68.) 
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commentors or the conduct on the part of plaintiff to which 
they had reacted, and Dr. Fiske made no effort to secure this 
data . Being admittedly unable to discern whether so much as 
one single comment was in her professional opinion affected by 
"male stereotyping, 11 Dr. Fiske nevertheless did not hesitate to 
engage in "expert" speculation. 
The court appeared to agree with Dr. Fiske's 
uninformed and unfounded speculation that the stereotyping 
phenomenon "played an undefined role in blocking plaintiff's 
admission, 11 but did not identify with any degree of clarity the 
"proof" upon which it based this conclusion. ( RE 2 5. ) It did 
however cite the plaintiff's evidentiary theory as follows: 
( RE 21. ) 
Plaintiff claims that this type of sexual 
stereotyping is reflected in comments about her 
aggressiveness and profanity that indicate she 
was being evaluated as a woman and not simply as 
a partnership candidate. One commentor said "she 
may have ov ercompensated for being a woman. 11 
Another suggested that she needed to take a 
"course at charm school." 
In evaluating these claims the following 
uncontradicted evidence is probative. 
First , the court's reference to and reliance on 
"comments about her aggressiveness and profanity" without 
citation belies the fact that not one of her critics referred 
to either in their written comments. The subject of profanity 
arose only when an Admissions Committee member noted a 
reference to profanity in her personnel file and asked an OGS 
partner about the reference. (Tr. 321; Def. Exh. 30.) Neither 
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plaintiff nor Price Waterhouse contends that she was placed on 
hold because of her use of profanity. 
Second, the partner's comment that plaintiff may have 
overcompensated for being a woman was made in the context of 
the partner's explaining why he had changed his vote from 
"hold" to "yes." (Def. Exh. 31.) He sought to excuse her 
unacceptable behavior on the grounds that she might have been 
concerned that she would be criticized if she were not 
sufficiently aggressive. Even if this indicated that plaintiff 
was being evaluated as a woman, this factor worked to her favor 
as it allowed the partner to excuse otherwise unacceptable 
behavior. 
Third, a critic's comment that plaintiff needed to 
take a course at "charm school" is not sex indicative. Charm 
is considered a positive characteristic for male and female 
partnership ca~didates. (Def. Exh . 68 at 49, 51, 98, 103, 147 
& 148.) Furthermore, the term "charm school" is commonly used 
with respect to men or women to describe classes that teach 
"manners." 
The court also claimed that the comments of 
plaintiff's supporters indicated that the complaints by her 
critics were somehow more harshly stated because of 
disappointed stereotyped expectations. (RE 21.) Of the 
remarks by plaintiff's supporters cited by the court for this 
proposition, only one even purports to address complaints by 
plaintiff's critics . Then too, it speculates about the 
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derivation of what turned out to be nonexistent complaints 
about plaintiff's profanity. (Def. Exh. 30.) The other 
supporters cited do not even mention plaintiff's critics. (Id. ) 
Perhaps the most mischaracterized statement in the 
court's decision was that by Mr. Beyer, plaintiff's strongest 
supporter. Mr. Beyer made the comment attributed to him but 
the court was incorrect in stating that he was "responsible for 
telling her what problems the Policy Board had identified with 
her candidacy." ( RE 22. ) It was Mr. Connor, the firm's Senior 
Partner, who took on this responsibility, and he did not 
mention to plaintiff any concerns about her femininity in their 
discussion. (Tr. 89-95.) 
Mr. Beyer is not a member of the Policy Board, and 
therefore his only information about the "hold" decision came 
from Mr. Connor. Mr . Connor explained to Mr. Beyer that 
plaintiff wo~ld have to tone down her approach to people 
because she had irritated a number of partners, whom Mr. Connor 
did not identify. (Tr. 213.) No mention was made during this 
conversation of plaintiff's style of dress or grooming. 
(Tr. 168. ) 
Presumably as further support for its conclusion that 
sex stereotyping played an undefined role in the admissions 
process as to plaintiff, the court cited isolated comments 
concerning female candidates in prior years. (RE 22.) None of 
these comments were made by partners who commented on 
plaintiff's candidacy. (Compare Def. Exh. 63 with Def. 
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Exh. 27.) Moreover there was no evidence adduced to provide a 
foundation or context for interpreting some hidden motivation 
for the remarks . That is to say, neither the authors nor the 
subjects of the remarks were called to testify. Nevertheless, 
the court felt free to read its interpretation of an 
unconscious motive into the remarks. 
In so doing, the court made no attempt to reconcile 
its interpretations of these comments with the evidence before 
it. First, the court stated that "[t)o be identified as a 
'women's lib [b)er' was regarded as negative comment," (RE 22), 
and suggested that the Policy Board was willing to credit and 
rely upon the remark. That candidate was admitted the first 
time she was proposed. (Def. Exh. 63, Tab 5.) 
Second, a partner was described by the court as 
"repeatedly" commenting that he could not seriously consider 
any woman as a partnership candidate, and the firm allegedly 
took no action to discourage his comments and recorded his vote 
in the overall summary . The comment appeared only in the 1981 
admissions cycle and was not repeated thereafter. (Def. Exh. 
63, at Tabs 3 & 10.) Furthermore, his vote was not included in 
the statistical summaries recording such recommendations. 
(Id.) The testimony concerning the firm's reactions to such 
comments established that the comments were ignored. While the 
then current chairman of the Admissions Committee could not 
recall whether the partner had been told to refrain from 
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submitting such comments, (Tr. 280), the comments never 
recurred after 1981. (Def. Exh. 63.) 
Finally, the court noted that the Policy Board had 
rejected two other women candidates because of concerns about 
interpersonal skills. (RE 23.) The first candidate cited, 
however, was not from a prior year, as the court claimed. She 
was proposed the year after plaintiff's proposal. 
6 3 , at Tab 4 . ) 
(Def. Exh. 
The second candidate was indeed described as "Ma 
Barker." (Id. at Tab 10.) The record shows that the candidate 
was the victim of, if anything, cultural stereotyping.L§_/ That 
is, she was characterized as a hick by a partner who was 
concerned that her effectiveness as a partner would be limited 
to the "oil patch" area surrounding Houston. Similarly, the 
record also shows that the "one of the boys" remark refers not 
to masculine characteristics, but to her habit of choosing to 
lunch and socialize with the clerical staff rather than the 
professional staff. (Id.; Connor Dep. at 84.) 
While the court viewed the documents before it as 
somehow supporting the conclusion that unconscious stereotyping 
6/ Presumably the court would have considered a remark 
comparing her to Al Capone to be not indicative that 
stereotyping was at work. The point is that it takes a great 
leap of faith to accept without any foundation whatsoever that 
the reference alone proves that partners held stereotyped 
expectations and were reacting more harshly to this candidate's 




had occurred, it specifically found that no partner who 
commented negatively about plaintiff had engaged in intentional 
discrimination. (RE 25.) Moreover, the court also found that 
none of the members of the Policy Board had engaged in such 
invidious discrimination. ( RE 28-29. ) The court instead found 
Price Waterhouse liable under Title VII because its Policy 
Board in deciding to defer ultimate disposition of plaintiff's 
candidacy had received and reviewed negative comments possibly 
made more intense as a result of disappointed stereotyped 
expectations and did so under circumstances where it should 
have recognized clear indications of this possibility. (RE 
26.) The allegedly "clear indications" recounted, however, 
were the same comments and statements discussed earlier, and 
are therefore based on the same faulty assumptions and 
disregard of the record before the court. 
Thus, the court's decision in effect required the firm 
to take affirmative steps to redress a problem that had not 
been shown, much less proven, to exist. Price Waterhouse 
therefore submits that the court's decision must be reversed. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Price Waterhouse submits in its appeal that the 
district court erred as a matter of law in ruling that 
plaintiff had satisfied her burden of proving unlawful sex 
discrimination without proving intentional discrimination on 
the part of any official of Price Waterhouse. Furthermore, the 
18 
court erred in finding liability where the plaintiff failed to 
prove that the "unconscious" alleged "discrimination" had any 
causal impact on the "hold" decision challenged by plaintiff. 
The court's decision is further challenged on the grounds that 
there was no competent evidence to support the findings 
underlying the liability determination. 
In response to plaintiff's appeal in this proceeding 
Price Waterhouse submits that even if the "hold" decision was 
discriminatory, the plaintiff was not entitled to relief other 
than that awarded by the court because she voluntarily resigned 
her employment under circumstances that did not establish that 
she was constructively discharged, and because she failed to 
prove up the amount of damages to which she might otherwise be 
entitled for the period preceding her voluntary resignation. 
ARGUMENT 
A. The District Court Applied Novel And Unsupported Legal 
Standards For Liability And Causation Contrary To 
Established Title VII Precedent. 
Plaintiff's theory in this case was one of disparate 
treatment or intentional discrimination because of her sex. 
(RE 30-31 n.16.) The primary issue on this appeal is whether 
the conduct found by district court violates Title VII's 
prohibition against discrimination with respect to the terms of 
conditions of employment "because of" an employee's sex. 42 
U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a). or disparate treatment. Under 
well-settled case law, to establish such a Title VII violation 
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the plaintiff has the burden of proving both intent and 
causation. Thus, plaintiff must prove that she was the subject 
of "intentional'' discriminatory treatment based on her sex. 
United States Postal Service v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711 (1983); 
Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 
(1981). In addition, the plaintiff must prove that such 
intentional sex-based discrimination caused the adverse 
employment decision in the sense that her sex was a determining 
factor. Toney v. Block, 705 F.2d 1364 (D.C. Cir. 1983); cf. 
Cuddy v. Carmen, 762 F.2d 119 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 106 S. 
Ct. 597 (1985). 
In this case the trial court made -- and could make --
no such findings. Thus, the court found that any prima facie 
case made out by plaintiff had been rebutted by Price 
Waterhouse, which established that there were legitimate, 
nondiscriminatory reasons for the Policy Board's decision to 
place plaintiff on hold in 1983. The court found that these 
reasons were not pretextual. The court also found that Price 
Waterhouse did not discriminate against plaintiff due to her 
sex in the weight it gave to criticisms of plaintiff's 
interpersonal skills relative to men whose skills were 
criticized. ( RE 20. ) 
Finally, the court made no finding that any partner 
submitted comments to the Policy Board that were influenced by 
an intent to discriminate, and indeed said that it was 
"impossible" to do so. (RE 25.) To the contrary the court 
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found that neither the comments nor Dr. Fiske's testimony about 
them "prove[d) an intentional discriminatory motive or 
purpose . " (RE 25.) Rather, the court characterized any sex 
stereotyping as "unconscious." (RE 25.) As to the effect of 
such sex stereotyping, moreover, the court was unable to find a 
causal nexus between any unconscious overstatements on the part 
of unidentified partners and the Policy Board's decision to 
place plaintiff on "hold." The court clearly stated that it 
was unable to find that plaintiff "would have been elected to 
the partne~ship if the Policy Board's decision had not been 
tainted by sexually biased evaluations," in light of her 
"considerable problems dealing with staff and peers. 11 ( RE 31. ) 
Given such findings, plaintiff could not have 
prevailed under the established case law principles concerning 
employment discrimination . However, the trial court 
nevertheless found a violation based on the possible existence 
of unconscious overreactions based on stereotypes which had not 
been shown to have made any difference in the Policy Board's 
decision nor to have caused any adverse consequences. Such a 
result is wrong as a matter of law. 
In concluding that plaintiff was excused from proving 
that the existence of sexual stereotyping had any impact on the 
decisions made, the court below cited problematic dictum in 
this Court's per curiam decision in Day v. Mathews, 530 F.2d 
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1083 (D.C. Cir. 1976) .fl/ However, the vitality of 
Day v. Mathews has been undermined by subsequent case law, as 
this Court noted when it declined to apply Day in 
Toney v. Block, 705 F.2d 1364 (D.C. Cir. 1983).L.§/ In Toney, 
this Court distinguished between a case where the plaintiff has 
proven unlawful discrimination in the very employment decision 
in question (as in Day) and a case where the plaintiff has only 
proven "generalized discrimination" or unlawful discrimination 
in the unit or system but which "has not been specifically 
attributed to the employment decision of which the plaintiff 
complains" ( as in Toney) . Id. at 1366-67. In the latter-type 
of case the burden remains on the plaintiff to prove both that 
there was unlawful discrimination and that it caused the 
adverse result of which the plaintiff complains; it is not the 
11 Day v. Mathews involved an appeal of a judgment awarding 
the plaintiff back pay from the date on which he was denied a 
promotion, the trial court having found that plaintiff's 
performance rating had been adversely affected by racial 
discrimination . This Court reversed because the trial court 
had not determined whether the plaintiff would have received 
the promotion "but for" the discrimination. 530 F.2d at 
1084-85. In a gratuitous discussion for the trial court's 
"guidance" on remand (but not necessary to the decision), the 
opinion asserted that the employer had the burden of proving by 
"clear and convincing evidence" that the plaintiff would not 
have been promoted. Id. at 1085-86. Unfortunately, the 
Court's goal of clarifying the law has not been fulfilled, as 
Day v. Mathews has led to confusion. ~' Milton v. 
Weinberger, 696 F.2d 94 (D.C. Cir. 1982). 
~/ The trial court also cited Williams v. Boorstin, 663 F.2d 
109 (D.C. Cir. 1980), cert . denied, 451 U.S. 985 (1981), but 
that decision merely held, in reversing a judgment for the 
plaintiff on a claim of retaliation, that the employer had 
satisfied the Day standard. 
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employer's burden to prove that the result would have been the 
same even if there had not been discrimination. 
This case plainly falls on the Toney side of the 
line. The trial court found, at most, "generalized 
discrimination" in the form of "unconscious" stereotyping in 
the comments of unspecified partners, but did not find that the 
Policy Board discriminated against plaintiff because she was a 
woman in holding her for future consideration. To impose upon 
Price Waterhouse the burden of proving that this essentially 
nonidentifiable "discrimination" did not affect its decision 
would effectly reverse the burden of proof as to the existence 
of both "discrimination" and causation. 
The trial court ' s conclusion that there was a 
violation also rested upon an erroneous legal premise 
concerning the relev a n ce of "tainted" or discriminatory 
comments by unidentified people other than those who made the 
decision in question , particularly where that decision was made 
by a collegial body such as the Policy Board. The court found 
it sufficient that comments reflecting discriminatory 
stereotypes may have "played a part" in the sense that they 
were considered in some manner by the decisionmakers. However, 
a plaintiff cannot prove a violation by showing only that 
someone who made a recommendation was biased; the plaintiff 
must also prove that the decisionmaker shared that bias. ~, 
LaMontagne v. Convenience Prods., Inc., 750 F.2d 1405, 1412 
( 7th Ci r . 198 4 ) . Moreover, when the decisionmaker is a 
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collegial body such as the Policy Board, a Title VII plaintiff 
must prove that group's decision was adverse because "enough of 
the members . voted against plaintiff because of an intent 
to discriminate." Banerjee v. Board of Trustees of Smith 
College, 648 F.2d 61, 65 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 
1098 (1981). Here plaintiff did not and could not come close 
to such a showing, and there was no evidence that the Policy 
Board's decision was to any degree motivated by or based on her 
sex. The only evidence as to the Policy Board's motivation was 
the_ unchallenged testimony of its members that plaintiff's sex 
was in no way a factor in the Board's decision. (Tr. 260, 262 
& 313. ) 
Having no basis for not crediting that testimony, the 
trial court adopted the novel theory that the Board's decision 
was "tainted" because (1) some unspecified negative comments to 
the Board about plaintiff reflected discriminatory 
stereotyping; (2) the Board considered and gave weight to all 
negative comments; and (3) the Board had not taken steps to 
discourage stereotyping or to alert the partners to the 
possibility that their judgments may be biased in the level of 
intensity with which negative characteristics were described 
(even if not in the basic substance). As we show in the next 
section, the court's findings in this regard cannot stand. But 
even if they are accepted, there is no precedent for finding 
liability on the basis of such "defects" in the system without 
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proof that they in fact affected the decision bout which 
plaintiff complains.~/ 
In sum, the district court's determination of 
liability rests at bottom upon the unprecedented premise that a 
Title VII violation based on discrimination in hiring, 
compensation, terms, conditions or privileges of employment 
because of an employee's sex can be made out by showing merely 
that an evaluation process was maintained in a less-than-
perfect manner which did not preclude consideration of comments 
that may reflect or be expressed in stereotypical terms, even 
though there was no evidence that the decision itself was in 
fact. Such a principle would carry Title VII far beyond its 
intended scope and would have the courts dealing more with form 
than with substance. The legal premise of the decision below 
was erroneous and unsound, and should be reversed. 
B. There Is No Competent Evidence To Support The District 
Court's Finding That Unidentifiable Complaints Were 
Affected By Disappointed Stereotyped Expectations. 
Even if this Court were to determine that as a matter 
of law the conduct found by the district court violates 
~/ There is no dispute that the Policy Board treated plaintiff 
exactly the same as male candidates even at a time when it was 
not clear that consideration of employees for partnership was 
subject to Title VII. The only appellate decision at the time 
had held to the contrary, affirming the dismissal of a Title 
VII complaint. Hishon v. King & Spalding, 678 F.2d 1022 (11th 
Cir. 1982), rev'd, 467 U.S. 69 (1984). It would be unfair to 
impose liability on Price Waterhouse on the basis of a theory 
that Title VII not only applies but requires more than equal 
treatment. 
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Title VII's prohibition against disparate treatment or 
intentional discrimination, the court's liability determination 
should still be reversed since it rests upon factual findings 
that are without any competent evidentiary support. It is 
established law in this Court that a liability determination of 
a district court is "clearly erroneous" and must be reversed 
where it is based upon factual findings that are "without 
substantial evidentiary support." Cuddy v . Carmen, 762 F.2d 
119 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 597 (1985); North 
Central Airlines v. Continental Oil Co., 574 F.2d 582 (D.C. 
Cir. 1978). 
Price Waterhouse submits in this regard that there is 
no competent evidence in the record to support the district 
court's finding that unidentifed partners may have more harshly 
criticized plaintiff's offensive conduct which conduct the 
district court found deserved criticism, because such offensive 
conduct contrasted with their stereotyped expectations about 
female behavior. Moreover, even if this finding were credited, 
there is no evidentiary basis to support the finding that the 
undefined marginal difference in the intensity of those 
partners' otherwise appropriate reactions that could be 
attributed to disappointed stereotyped expectations actually 
"played a role" in the decision of the Policy Board to hold 
plaintiff's candidacy. Price Waterhouse submits that any 
rational and disciplined review of the record reveals these 
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findings to be utterly without foundation and therefore they 
cannot be sustained. 
The analysis of the challenged findings under the 
above standard of review must begin with those judicial 
findings respecting complaints about plaintiff's interpersonal 
behavior that are not disputed in this proceeding. First, the 
district court found, after observing plaintiff and listening 
to her testimony and the testimony of partners and staff from 
Price Waterhouse, that plaintiff's conduct at the firm provided 
"ample justification" for the complaints that she was overly 
aggressive, unduly harsh, difficult to work with and impatient 
with staff as well as insensitive with others. This finding is 
not challenged by the plaintiff in her appeal and is settled. 
Next, the district court found that criticisms of 
interpersonal skills or behavior such as those properly 
directed at plaintiff had regularly been made about male 
partnership candidates and regularly resulted in a "hold" or 
"no admission" disposition of those candidacies. The court 
further found that the criticisms made of plaintiff's behavior 
had been weighed and considered by the Policy Board no 
differently than such criticisms had been considered and 
weighed with male candidates. 
challenged by plaintiff. 
These findings are not 
Following this, the district court held that it was 
impossible to label any particular criticism of plaintiff's 
interpersonal behavior as having been made more intense by the 
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phenomenon of disappointed stereotyped expectations. That is 
to say, the district court found that plaintiff failed to prove 
that even one specific criticism was somehow more harsh because 
of disappointed stereotyped expectations. This finding is not 
challenged by plaintiff in this proceeding. 
The unchallenged findings make clear this is not a 
case where an employer is alleged to be intolerant of 
aggressive or assertive behavior in females. The findings by 
the district court demonstrate that Price Waterhouse encouraged 
assertive and aggressive behavior by males and females. 
(Tr. 571 & 577.) Conversely, the firm did not countenance 
overly aggressive, ~, rude, insensitive, and unduly harsh 
behavior by males or females. The issue here was whether the 
complaints about such unacceptable behavior by plaintiff were 
by some measure more intense than the complaints about this 
same undesirable conduct in males. 
Upon what then did the district court rely in 
determining, as it did, that partners offering what the court 
found to be amply justified complaints about plaintiff's 
undesirable behavior reacted more harshly because they held 
stereotyped expectations that were breached? The court did not 
rely on any of the usual evidentiary tools courts have employed 
to ascertain disparate treatment.fl.QI None of the negative 
10/ Decisions under Title VII recognize three categories of 
proof plaintiffs may employ to meet their burden of 
(footnote continued) 
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commentors were cal l ed as witnesses and cross-examined by 
plaintiff. Plaintiff did not offer deposition testimony by any 
of these persons who supposedly overreacted to plaintiff's 
objectionable behavior because their stereotype was traversed . 
Similarly, plaintiff offered no evidence, documentary or 
testimonial, to examine the particular experience or conduct 
that precipitated any reaction or comment by any partner. 
Price Waterhouse did call partners from different offices with 
whom plaintiff had substantial contact and who offered serious 
criticisms of her interpersonal skills during the admissions 
process. They explained the basis for their negative remarks 
and were cross examined. The court specifically found one 
partner's comments to be free from any taint of discrimination 
and did not find the other partner ' s comments affected by 
discrimination. ( RE 16 . ) 
(footnote continued) 
establishing disparate treatment . The first is "direct 
evidence" of the alleged discriminating evaluators' announced 
or admitted improper motive. See, e.g., LaMontagne v. American 
Convenience Prod. Inc . , 750 F.2d 1405 (7th Cir. 1984); Lee v. 
Russell Cty. Bd . Educ., 684 F.2d 769 (5th Cir. 1982); Zebedeo 
v . Martin E . Segal Co., 582 F. Supp. 1394 (D . Conn. 1984). 
Plaintiff did not offer this. Another type of proof is 
circumstantial proof in the nature of comparative evidence. 
Plaintiff did not offer this . A final category of proof is 
statistical proof. This type of proof, unless compelling, will 
generally not suffice to prove individual disparate treatment. 
Here plaintiff's statistical proof was not credited by the 
court . (RE 20-21.) 
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The district court instead relied upon the testimony 
of plaintiff's expert, Dr. Susan Fiske, who testified that the 
phenomenon of stereotyping exists in society and who provided 
the court with a profile or a "stereotype" that would 
supposedly allow the court to identify stereotyping suspects, 
in the absence of competent proof. 
Based on only a superficial review of long and short 
form comments concerning plaintiff and some other candidates 
and the application of her stereotyping filter, Dr. Fiske 
concluded that stereotyping was present and was a major factor 
in the firm's evaluation of plaintiff. This was the sum and 
substance of plaintiff's "rebuttal" case. Dr. Fiske examined 
benign, sex neutral evaluative comments in a vacuum and 
concluded that they were overreactions based upon disappointed 
stereotyped expectations. She did so 
-- without comparing the comments to three years' 
worth of admissions materials in which men are 
described in terms exactly the same as or similar to 
those suspected by Dr. Fiske to be overreactions (in 
some cases by the very partners who used such terms to 
describe plaintiff); 
despite the fact she had no information and 
made no effort to obtain the same concerning those who 
wrote these comments; 
-- despite the fact she admittedly had no earthly 
idea what offensive conduct by plaintiff had triggered 
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. . 
the comments which the court held amply justified 
(Tr . 597);@/ and 
despite the fact that the science which she 
claimed had determined the existence of this 
phenomenon placed great importance on knowing the 
specifics of the underlying conduct being evaluated. 
(Tr. 538; RE 24 nn.10 & 12.) 
Thus, Dr. Fiske's conclusions that partners' comments 
concerning plaintiff's interpersonal skills resulted from 
stereotyped notions of how women ought to behave were based 
solely on how they expressed themselves in, in most cases, one 
or two sentences on the long and short forms. Although she 
acknowledged that certain behaviors justify such comments 
regardless of the sex of those engaging in such behavior, she 
had no idea whether plaintiff's conduct or interactions with 
these partners provided such justification in these 
circumstances . Price Waterhouse submits therefore that 
Dr. Fiske's testimony in this case is tantamount, in an 
evidentiary sense, to testimony by an individual who purports 
to be able to analyze an individual's handwriting and reach 
conclusions about that individual's personality, without 
meeting the individual personally or even learning anything 
l.!_/ Indeed, Dr . Fiske had not even met the plaintiff before 
she reached her conclusions concerning the presence of 
stereotyping in plaintiff's evaluations. (Tr. 569 . ) 
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about the individual. Surely this does not suffice to carry 
the plaintiff's burden and is not "substantial evidence." 
In so arguing, Price Waterhouse does not mean to 
denigrate Dr. Fiske's field of expertise. It merely submits 
that she did not have at her disposal sufficient information to 
reach any informed conclusion about the role of stereotyping in 
the admissions process at Price Waterhouse. Her testimony 
therefore was sheer speculation, and of no evidentiary 
value.ill/ 
The court's decision does not clearly indicate the 
extent to which it relies upon Dr. Fiske's testimony. The 
court did hold quite specifically that neither it nor Dr. Fiske 
could determine whether any particular reaction to plaintiff's 
behavior was affected by stereotyping or the degree to which 
the phenomenon affected the decision to "hold'' plaintiff. The 
court, however, did appear to rely upon Dr. Fiske's profile of 
12/ The fact that Dr. Fiske's opinion is not based on data 
reasonably relied upon in her field renders her testimony of 
little, if any, probative value. In re Agent Orange Product 
Liability Litigation, 611 F. Supp. 1223 (E.D.N.Y. 1985). See 
also Merit Motors Inc. v. Chrysler Corp., 569 F.2d 666 (D.C. 
Cir. 1977) (an expert's conclusions based upon speculative or 
unfounded facts is of no evidentiary value.) A review of the 
published research in the area of sex stereotyped evaluations 
cited by the district court reveals the nature and type of data 
which experts in the field usually rely upon in reaching 
conclusions. See, e.g., Wiley & Eskilson, Coping in the 
Corporation, Sex Role Constraints, 12 J. App. Soc. Psych. 2, 3, 
9 (1982). Of central importance is knowing the specific nature 
of the conduct to which the possibly stereotyping evaluators 
are responding. Here the plaintiff's expert expressed no 
interest in and did not know anything about the conduct to 
which she claimed some persons overreacted. 
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l. 
a stereotyper when it suggested that the partners who commented 
negatively about plaintiff's interpersonal behavior on the 
basis of less than substantial contact, i.e., short form 
commentors, may have been the stereotypers. (RE 26 . )L.±l_/ In 
reaching this abstract conclusion, the district court remained 
clear that it could not identify any specific short form 
commenter whose reaction was disproportionately harsh, much 
less too harsh because of disappointed stereotyped 
expectations./14/ 
In addition to the use of Dr. Fiske's profile, the 
court engaged in its own speculation that the bare written 
words of various comments about plaintiff somehow revealed that 
certain unidentified comments were stated more harshly because 
of disappointed stereotyped expectations. A careful analysis 
of the "evidence" cited by the court for this conclusion 
reveals it to be merely the court's unsupported inferences 
13/ The court suggested that it was this group that 
stereotyped when it observed critically that "[t]he Policy 
Board gave great weight to the negative views of individuals 
who had very little contact with plaintiff." (RE 26.) The 
court never reconciled that remark with its finding that the 
"negative comments of short form evaluators are often in sharp 
contrast to the glowing reports of partners who have had 
extensive contact" and that such comments often resulted in a 
"no" or "hold" decision. (RE 19.) 
14/ As it turns out, the harshest comments about plaintiff 
came from a long form completed by Mr. Epelbaum, who had 
substantial contact with plaintiff and whose remarks were 
specifically found by the district court not to be tainted by 
discrimination. (RE 16; Def. Exh. 27.) That finding is not 
challenged in this proceeding. 
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concerning unexplored isolated written materials from the 
admissions process. 
The court first examined comments concerning plaintiff 
specifically. (RE 21-22 . ) The court observed that "[s]everal 
of the negative comments allude to the plaintiff's sex . " 
(RE 26.) Any rational reading of the remarks reveals that that 
observation is flatly incorrect. (Def. Exh. 27.) This 
observation indicates the court's predilection to read improper 
meanings or bases into perfectly neutral words. 
The court then proceeded to cite several remarks, 
almost all of which were made by plaintiff's supporters. 
Despite the fact that plaintiff had ample opportunity to call 
as witnesses those who wrote these comments, she only called 
one -- Mr. Beyer. Mr. Beyer's testimony, combined with that of 
Mr . Connor and plaintiff, clearly show that he was not 
responsible for telling plaintiff what problems the Policy 
Board had identified with her candidacy. He had no personal 
knowledge (or even complete second-hand knowledge) of the 
complaints received by the Policy Board. It was Mr. Connor who 
had taken on the task of explaining to plaintiff the basis for 
the Policy Board's decision, and it is undisputed that he made 
no comments that even suggested that she had been held instead 
of admitted because of her sex. 
Thus, Mr. Beyer's advice to plaintiff is not probative 
of the Policy Board's reasons for ''holding" plaintiff's 
candidacy. Neither is it probative of the basis for the 
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underlying comments supporting the Policy Board's 
decision.ill/ The uncontradicted evidence is that Mr. Beyer 
did not know the identities of those who had opposed 
plaintiff's candidacy, and that he did not know the specifics 
of any criticisms, much less the conduct on which such 
criticisms were based. Furthermore, even if he had known the 
identities of the critics and their criticisms, there was no 
evidence that he based his advice on these criticisms. On the 
record before the court, the most that could properly be 
concluded is that Mr. Beyer himself (plaintiff's strongest 
supporter) might have personally preferred that plaintiff 
conduct herself more femininely just as he might have preferred 
that a male candidate conduct himself more masculinely. 
The other comments from plaintiff's supporters are no 
more probative of the state of mind of her critics or the 
Policy Board. Furthermore, there was no foundation upon which 
to base the conclusion that these partners intended by their 
remarks to comment upon others' criticisms. Plaintiff called 
none of them as witnesses, and indeed never asked Mr. Coffey, 
who was called as a witness by Price Waterhouse, about his 
statement cited by the court. Indeed, Mr. Coffey's positive 
15/ Plaintiff never claimed Mr. Beyer was communicating the 
bases for the other partners' complaints. (Plaintiff's own 
testimony establishes Mr. Beyer did not know who the critics of 
plaintiff were.) (Tr. 82, 89.) Plaintiff received and 
rejected Mr. Beyer's advice for what it was, his own personal 
thoughts on how to put one's "best foot forward." (Tr. 102-03 . ) 
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remark was not even before the court at the time of his 
testimony since as the plaintiff's theory only came in later as 
improper rebuttal. Thus, there was no evidence that the 
supporters who made these comments knew plaintiff's critics, or 
the nature of or basis for their criticisms. Without such 
foundation, the court could at most conclude that her 
supporters were expressing their own views.L.1.§./ 
The court, however, did not limit its speculation to 
these matters . The court also speculated that the Policy Board 
should have recognized that unconscious stereotyping had played 
a role in plaintiff's evaluations. In order to reach this 
conclusion, the court engaged in further selective 
interpretation of isolated statements concerning female 
candidates from previous admissions cycles. Its exhaustive 
review of the admissions materials revealed only three 
"suspect" comments prior to plaintiff's candidacy. The court 
then proceeded to characterize these three statements as the 
"regular fodder" of the process. (RE 23.) 
16/ Even if the statements of plaintiff's supporters were 
viewed in a light most favorable to plaintiff's theory, they 
establish only that these supporters were conscious of her 
sex. Assuming for sake of argument that this is improper, it 
is elementary law that evidence of an improper motive on the 
part of persons who did not make the decision being challenged 
does not prove the improper motive of the alleged 
discriminating officials. DeHorney v. Bank of America, 777 
F . 2d 440 (9th Cir. 1985); Van Houdnos v. Evans, 39 FEP Cases 
1639 (C . D. Ill. 1986). 
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Again, the court imputed its own interpretation of 
these comments to the Policy Board, but this time in the face 
of direct evidence that the Policy Board did not so interpret 
them. the comment characterizing a candidate as a "women's 
libber" was considered by the Policy Board to be "extreme." In 
any event, the Policy Board concluded that she should be 
admitted. (Def. Exh. 63, at Tab 5.) 
As to the blatantly discriminatory comment by one 
partner one year, there is no dispute that the comment was 
completely ignored by the Policy Board. This partner's vote 
was not even recorded in the statistical summaries. 
Furthermore, although the then current chairman of the 
Admissions Committee could not recall if anyone from that 
committee discouraged this partner from making such comments in 
the future, he made no such comments in the 1982, 1983 or 1984 
admissions cycles. Such comments were therefore of no further 
concern to the Policy Board by the time that plaintiff was 
proposed. 
Finally, the record before the court established that 
the candidate described as "Ma Barker" and "one of the boys" 
was not the victim of sex discrimination. The context of the 
"Ma Barker" comment indicates that the commentor perceived that 
the candidate would be effective only in the Houston "oil 
patch" region because he thought of her as somewhat of a 
"hick." More importantly, the testimony of Mr. Ziegler 
confirmed that the Policy Board so interpreted his comment. 
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The reference to "one of the boys" in the Policy Board 
memorandum did not criticize her for masculine conduct . She 
actually was criticized for lunching and socializing with the 
support staff rather than the professional staff. 
Despite the fact that the sum total of the court's 
"evidence" of sex stereotyping is zero, the court concluded 
that the Policy Board, in relying to some undefined extent upon 
"tainted" comments in acting upon plaintiff's candidacy, 
discriminated against plaintiff. Such an approach is entirely 
inconsistent with the concepts of burden of proof that have 
been firmly established by the Supreme Court. Plaintiff 
maintains this burden throughout, and yet the court inferred 
"evidence" of discrimination from bare words that had been 
unexplored by plaintiff but established to be nondiscriminatory 
by Price Waterhouse. To automatically adopt the inferences 
most favorable to plaintiff under such circumstances in effect 
places the burden of proof upon Price Waterhouse to disprove 
the presence of discrimination that plaintiff has not even 
established through competent, probative proof with proper 
evidentiary foundation.LU/ 
17/ In some respects, the decision in this case reads as 
though the court had a "hunch" that one or more complaining 
partners operated from a stereotype but had no evidence to 
establish the fact. Accordingly, the court set forth a litany 
of nonprobative facts, misstatements of facts, and conjectures 
which it then suggested could be added up to equal 
discrimination. Hunches do not suffice or substitute for 
evidence. See Andre v. Bendix Corp., 774 F.2d 786 (7th Cir. 
1985) (reversing a finding of discrimination based on a "hunch" 
without evidence). 
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The dangers inherent in basing a finding of 
discrimination upon such "evidence" are quite graphic in this 
case. In response to the proposal of plaintiff, the Policy 
Board received~ large number of intensely negative comments 
concerning her interpersonal skills. These comments according 
to the court had "ample justification." Such comments were 
viewed very seriously, and indeed the Policy Board regularly 
placed candidates on hold (and even rejected their candidacies 
totally) even in situations where the opposition was less 
widespread and less intense. Thus the Policy Board 
realistically only had two choices -- "hold" or "no" -- and 
chose the more favorable option that "afford[ed her] time to 
demonstrate that she has the personal and leadership qualities 
required of a partner." (Def. Exh. 37.) Under the court's 
decision, however, the Policy Board engaged in sex 
discrimination by not admitting her immediately, because 
isolated hearsay comments by supporters may have been meant to 
indicate that sex stereotyping played some undefined role in 
the evaluations completed by her critics. 
Price Waterhouse submits that the district court's 
decision ignores basis tenets of the rules of evidence and 
subverts Title VII to a use to which it was not intended. The 
district court's decision therefore must be reversed. 
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ARGUMENT IN RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFF'S APPEAL 
Plaintiff contends on her appeal that the trial court 
abused its broad remedial discretion by denying equitable 
relief. Plaintiff's appeal proceeds on the assumption that a 
plaintiff who establishes a violation is automatically entitled 
to "full relief. 11 (Pl. Br. 11, 14-15.) This Court has made 
clear however, that the questions of violation and relief are 
"conceptually distinct," and that it may be perfectly proper 
for a plaintiff who prevails to receive no relief other than 
the adjudication that violation occurred and attorney fees. 
~, Smith v. Secretary of the Navy, 659 F.2d 1113, 1120, 1122 
(D.C. Cir. 1981). Here, moreover, plaintiff avers that there 
have already been other "significant" benefits from the ruling 
below (e.g., "the damage to reputation that may accompany 
denial of partnership has been repaired" (Pl. Br. 15)). 
Plaintiff, however, seeks more, claiming that the 
district court should have either ordered Price Waterhouse to 
admit her as a partner (Pl. Br. 14), or in lieu of such relief 
should have required Price Waterhouse to pay her "front pay" 
premised on what she would have earned as partner for some 
indefinite period into the future, (id. at 19-20).Ll.§_/ 
18/ Plaintiff's statement of the issue presented addresses 
only "equitable relief" and not back pay. (Pl. Br. 1.) 
Although plaintiff argues that the district court erred in 
(footnote continued on next page) 
40 
In challenging the trial court's denial of such 
relief, plaintiff struggles to overcome the fact that she 
voluntarily terminated her employment contract with Price 
Waterhouse (Def. Exh. 53), by urging special treatment for 
employees in certain professional fields. However, her attempt 
to create an unprecedented exception to the governing legal 
principles is not only legally and factually unfounded, but 
unwise as a matter of policy. 
(footnote continued from previous page) 
denying back pay, she evidently seeks a remand on this issue 
only if there is a remand as to equitable relief. (Pl. Br. 
20-21.) In any event, the short answer is that, absent a court 
order or approval of a stipulation for a bifurcated trial, 
plaintiff proceeded at her risk in not offering evidence of 
damages. Under Rule 29, Fed. R. Civ. P., while the parties 
have some latitude to make stipulations concerning discovery, 
stipulations that may delay the ultimate disposition(~, 
extensions of time for discovery responses) must be approved by 
the court. Rule 42 authorizes separate trials as to any 
separate issue, but only upon "order" of the court. A party 
who wants a separate trial of an issue must make a clear 
request to the court by presenting a motion or stipulation and 
obtain a clear ruling; a vague statement in a transmittal 
document not clearly brought to the busy trial judge's 
attention does not suffice. A party who does not "go forward 
on issues that were properly in the case does so at its 
peril." U.S. Indus., Inc. v. Blake Constr. Co., 765 F.2d 195, 
209-10 (D.C. Cir. 1985). Plaintiff's reliance (Pl. Br. 20-21) 
upon Caviale v. Wisconsin Department of Health & Social 
Services, 744 F.2d 1289 (7th Cir. 1984), and Dougherty v. 
Barry, 607 F. Supp. 1271 (D.D.C. 1985), appeal pending, Nos. 
85-5715 et al., is misplaced. In Caviale the trial court had 
found the defendant employer not liable and hence had not 
reached the issue of relief, while in Dougherty the plaintiffs 
appear to have addressed relief at trial, but the record did 
not permit the court to make the calculations needed "to 
compute the exact amount of damages owed" under the particular 
approach to back pay adopted by the court. Id. at 1290. 
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The only violation found by the trial court concerned 
the Policy Board's decision that plaintiff should be held 
rather than made a partner in 1983. Even after the OGS 
partners decided not to repropose plaintiff for partnership 
consideration in the next round, plaintiff's situation was 
equivalent to that of any employee who sought but did not get a 
promotion. If having reason to believe that the failure to be 
elevated was tainted by impermissible considerations, such an 
employee is entitled to file a charge with EEOC, to participate 
in the voluntary conciliation efforts EEOC is obliged to make, 
and, if those are unsuccessful, to sue the employer. 42 U.S.C. 
§ 2000e-5. The law protects the employee from any retaliation 
by the employer for having filed a charge, sued, or taken other 
actions to assert rights under the act. 42 U.S.C. 
§ 2000e-3(a).m/ 
The law also requires an aggrieved employee to 
mitigate damages. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g). Where the employee 
is terminated, this means that the employee must seek and 
accept comparable employment elsewhere or accept an offer of 
reinstatement by the employer to a comparable position. ~, 
Ford Motor Co. v. EEOC, 458 U.S. 219 (1982); cf. Real v. 
Continental Group, Inc., 39 FEP Cases 1530 (N.D. Cal. 
19/ Plaintiff declined to press any claim of retaliation in 
this case (Tr. 139). 
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1986)./20/ Where the employee's job is abolished(~, in a 
reduction in force or plant closing), the employee has the 
obligation to seek out comparable employment inside the company 
or elsewhere. ~, Fink v. Western Elec. Co., 708 F.2d 909 
(4th Cir. 1983). Where the employee is denied advancement, the 
duty to mitigate requires that the employee accept the 
employer's offer to stay in the same job. ~, Alicea 
Rosado v. Garcia Santiago, 562 F.2d 114, 119-20 (1st Cir. 
1977). An employee who voluntarily resigns cannot claim the 
benefits of continued employment, nor claim damages or other 
relief for the period after resignation. ~, Clark v. Marsh, 
665 F.2d 1168, 1172 (D.C. Cir. 1981). 
Plaintiff seeks to circumvent these limitations on 
relief, arguing that she should be treated as if she had been 
involuntarily terminated. The only recognized principle under 
which plaintiff might make such a claim is the doctrine of 
"constructive discharge," most fully discussed by this Court in 
Clark v. Marsh, supra, 665 F.2d at 1172-76, upon which the 
district court relied. ( RE 32. ) 
20/ In Real, under the analogous Age Discrimination in 
Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621 et~-, even though the 
plaintiff had "willfully" been constructively discharged 
through a series of demotions, denials of promotions, and 
denial of relocation benefits, the court held that his failure 
to accept an offer of reinstatement to a position equivalent to 
his last position cut off the accrual of damages and barred 
reinstatement or front pay. 
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Under that doctrine, however, an employee confronted 
with a discriminatory decision is not entitled, merely because 
discrimination has occurred, to resign and claim to have been 
terminated involuntarily. As this Court observed in Clark, the 
case law indicates "a general reluctance to predicate a finding 
of constructive discharge upon the fact of discrimination." 
665 F.2d at 1173 (emphasis in original).m/ The Court added 
that "the courts join in stating that a 'finding of 
constructive discharge depends on "[whether the employer] 
deliberately made. . working conditions intolerable and 
drove [the employee] into "an involuntary quit."'" Id. /22/ 
21/ See generally Schlei & Grossman, Employment Discrimination 
Law 611-12 (1982) ("it is not enough to establish a 
constructive discharge if the plaintiff simply establishes that 
continued employment would have been under discriminatory 
condi t i ons " ); id. at 79-80 ( Supp. 1984) ( " failure to promote, 
in and of itself, does not establish constructive discharge"). 
22/ Plaintiff asserts that the district court misread Clark as 
requiring "that the employer deliberately undertake to make the 
employee quit." (Pl. Br. 17. ) However, the di strict court did 
not impose on plaintiff that requirement. Rather, the trial 
court properly restated what this Court said in Clark, where it 
found that the employer "deliberately made Clark's working 
conditions intolerable and drove her into an 'involuntary 
quit.'" 665 F.2d at 1176. While it is true that some cases 
hold that the employee need not prove that it was the 
employer's purpose or intent to force the employee to resign, 
all agree that the employee must prove at least that the 
employer deliberately or knowingly made working conditions 
intolerable. Id. at 1173 & n.5; Pittman v. Hattiesburg Mun. 
Separate School Dist., 644 F.2d 1071, 1077 (5th Cir. 1981); 
Goss v. Exxon Office Sys. Co., 747 F . 2d 885, 888 (3d Cir. 
1984); Bourgue v. Powell Elec. Mfg. Co., supra, 617 F.2d at 65; 
Schlei & Grossman, supra. 
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The rationale underlying this rule, and indeed the 
entire concept of constructive discharge, was described in 
Clark as follows: 
"[s]ociety and the policies underlying Title VII will 
be best served if, wherever possible, unlawful 
discrimination is attacked within the context of 
existing employment relationships." . . A Title VII 
plaintiff must, therefore, "mitigate damages by 
remaining on the job" unless that job presents "such 
an aggravated situation that a reasonable employee 
would be forced to resign." 
Id. at 1173 (quoting Bourque v. Powell Elec. Mfg. Co., 617 F.2d 
61, 66 (5th Cir. 1980)). 
Applying Clark, the district court correctly observed 
that "[t]he fact that discrimination has occurred does not, by 
itself, provide the 'aggravating factors' required to prove a 
constructive discharge." (RE 32.) The trial court specifically 
found that "plaintiff has not shown any history of 
discrimination, humiliation, or other aggravating factors that 
would have compelled her to resign." (Id.) Rather, the court 
found that her experience at the firm "was quite normal and 
amicable;" the firm "had offered to retain her as an 
employee;"~/ and some partners (including the 
partner-in-charge of OGS) had "encouraged her to take this 
23/ As Judge Gesell observed during trial, plaintiff had three 
options available to her, two of which involved continued 
employment by Price Waterhouse, i.e., rather than resign she 
could stay as a manager without expectation of partnership or 
stay as a manager with the then-remote possibility that she 
would later be made a partner. (Tr. 138.) 
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option rather than resign when it appeared unlikely that she 
could become a partner" (Id. )./24/ In sum, after hearing the 
witnesses the trial court found that, while not being made a 
partner in 1983 "was undoubtedly a professional disappointment, 
and it may have been professionally advantageous for plaintiff 
to leave the firm," she had "fail[ed] to show a constructive 
discharge. 11 ( RE 3 3 . ) ill/ 
Those fact findings cannot be set aside unless shown 
by plaintiff to be "clearly erroneous," and plaintiff has made 
no serious attempt to do so. Plaintiff's situation was not 
remotely comparable to that of the plaintiff in Clark.fl.§_/ The 
24/ Plaintiff repeatedly notes that one partner who had 
opposed her partnership, Mr. Epelbaum, advised her that if he 
were in her shoes he would leave. (Pl. Br. 5, 12, 18.) Far 
more significant was the encouragement she received from 
several partners with greater seniority than Mr. Epelbaum to 
stay. (Tr. 112.) 
25/ An employment decision perceived as a blow "to one's pride 
or prestige does not provide reason enough to resign during 
whatever period may be required to seek judicial or 
administrative relief," unless it constitutes a "drastic 
reduction in the quality of working conditions." Alicea Rosado 
v. Garcia Santiago, supra, 562 F.2d at 119-20. 
26/ Ms. Clark had been effectively blocked from advancement 
with her employer for 11 years. 665 F.2d at 1174. Plaintiff's 
career with Price Waterhouse progressed to her satisfaction 
until the Policy Board decision to place her partnership 
candidacy on hold. Ms. Clark had filed formal administrative 
charges three years before her resignation, but they had 
produced no corrective action. Id. Plaintiff, on the other 
hand, allowed less than four months to pass after filing her 
charge before she announced her intention to resign. Ms. Clark 
had been denied a promotion to a position that only one person 
could fill, and the desired position had been filled with a 
(footnote continued on next page) 
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only action found to have been tainted -- the Policy Board's 
decision to place plaintiff on hold could not have compelled 
or justified plaintiff's departure, for employees placed on 
hold typically were made partners eventually.ill/ The most 
that plaintiff can argue is that it was "reasonable" for 
someone in her position to leave Price Waterhouse and pursue a 
career elsewhere. (Pl. Br. 18.) Even if that were so, it does 
not follow -- and plaintiff did not prove -- that resigning was 
her only reasonable option, particularly if she still was 
(footnote continued from previous page) 
younger, recent law school graduate and presumably would not 
become vacant for some time. Id. at 1175. At Price 
Waterhouse, however, there is no limit upon the number of 
partners, and new partners are admitted every year. Finally, 
plaintiff did not establish, or even allege, the embarrassment 
and humiliation that Ms. Clark suffered. Ms. Clark had 
substantial supervisory experience and had filled the position 
to which she aspired on an acting basis for over six months, 
having been the deputy for three years before that. 
Notwithstanding these qualifications, she was demoted from the 
acting position to her previous position as deputy and was 
required thereafter to report to the successful candidate for 
the position, who had no supervisory experience. Id. at 
1174-76. 
27/ As plaintiff notes, 17 of the 19 other employees placed on 
hold with her were reproposed for partnership, and 15 of the 17 
were admitted. (Pl. Br. 5.) (The figures cited by plaintiff 
for employees who were "rejected" by the Policy Board are of 
little relevance because plaintiff was placed on hold, and was 
never rejected.) Plaintiff cannot justify her departure by 
invoking the subsequent decision of the OGS partners not to 
repropose her the next year, for the trial court specifically 
found that that decision was not discriminatory, (RE 17), a 
determination plaintiff does not challenge on appeal. 
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genuinely interested in becoming a partner at Price Waterhouse, 
as she testified at trial./28/ 
Plaintiff evidently recognizes her inability to 
challenge the trial court's determination that she was not 
constructively discharged. Thus, she now argues in this Court 
that the constructive discharge doctrine "cannot be 
meaningfully applied" and "is not germane . . to career 
making (or breaking) decisions, such as those involving 
partnership or university tenure." (Pl. Br. 11, 16.)@/ This 
is a surprising position, because it was plaintiff who first 
introduced the subject, after consulting with counsel (Def. 
Exh. 53), by claiming in her amended EEOC charge and in her 
court complaint(~~ 15, 19) that she had been subjected to 
"constructive discharge." 
In any event, plaintiff's attempt to carve out a 
special rule for aspirants to partnership is without merit. A 
decision concerning partnership can of course help or hurt a 
28/ Judge Gesell asked plaintiff at trial if she wanted to 
leave her present job "and go back and join this crowd? That's 
what you're asking me to do, right?" She answered: "That's 
correct." (Tr. 118.) Of course, a negative answer would have 
destroyed even a theoretical basis for seeking front pay in 
lieu of reinstatement. 
29/ This case involves admission as a member of an accounting 
partnership, not employment as a university professor. Whether 
any special rules are appropriate for up-or-out faculty tenure 
decisions is a question not presented in this case. 
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person's career./30/ But that is true of any number of 
decisions concerning employees in other situations: military 
or corporate officerships or other coveted organizational 
positions with few comparable alternatives(~, director of 
research); membership in the federal government's Senior 
Executive Service; and elevation within the career foreign 
service. Partnership in a firm such as Price Waterhouse is 
simply not so fundamentally different from other situations 
that disappointed aspirants should be freed of the same 
obligations and limitations that the law imposes on all other 
employees who are disappointed by their failure to be advanced 
as soon as they would like .fill 
30/ Whatever may once have been the case, with the increase in 
professional mobility it is no longer valid to regard decisions 
about partnership as necessarily "career making (or 
breaking)." It is now commonplace for those who become 
partners in a firm to leave and pursue their careers elsewhere, 
and it is also commonplace for persons denied partnership at 
one firm, if they leave, to become partners elsewhere or obtain 
other positions and to have flourishing careers. 
31/ Plaintiff attempts to analogize her position to that of a 
black applicant for a high-paying actuarial position who was 
offered only a low-paying, low-potential job as a bookkeeper. 
(Pl. Br. 16.) However, plaintiff had the opportunity to 
continue--and did so-- in an important job which was not 
beneath her qualifications or experience. A more apt 
comparison might be between plaintiff, who as an employee was 
entitled under Title VII to nondiscriminatory consideration for 
partnership as a "term, condition or privilege of plaintiff's 
employment" (Complaint, 16), and a non-employee applicant for 
lateral admission as a partner, who could claim no such rights 
under Title VII. See Hishon v . King & Spalding, 469 U. S . 69 
(1984). Plaintiff~Title VII claim is necessarily premised on 
her status as an employee of Price Waterhouse , and her 
voluntary severance of that relationship terminated the only 
basis for application of Title VII. 
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The facts of this case, moreover, provide a 
particularly uncompelling record for justifying special 
treatment or a new ad hoc rule for disappointed aspirants to 
partnership. While it has often been the case that 
partnerships follow an up-or-out policy, so that denial of 
partnership is tantamount to involuntary termination of 
employrnent,m/ that was indisputably not the case at Price 
Waterhouse. Moreover, unlike the failure of an employee to be 
promoted to a position where the person selected would be 
expected to have a long incumbency, leaving no comparable 
opportunities in the "short term" about which plaintiff 
expresses concern, (Pl. Br. 16), Price Waterhouse has no 
arbitrary limits on the number of partners. Thus, the decision 
to hold plaintiff in 1983 did not mean that there would be any 
fewer partnership opportunities at Price Waterhouse in the 
future. 
At bottom, plaintiff's appeal rests on the assertion 
that no purpose would be served by requiring her "to stay where 
[she was] simply to pursue a Title VII claim." (Pl. Br. 16.) 
Again, plaintiff's argument is inconsistent with her prior 
position, for her initial response to Price Waterhouse's 
decisions concerning her partnership prospects was to stay 
where she was and to pursue a Title VII claim: she filed her 
32/ See, e.g., Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 72 
(1984); cf. Delaware State College v. Ricks, 449 U.S. 250, 
252-53 (1980). 
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charge of discriminatory denial of partnership in August 1983, 
four months before she decided to resign. 
Throughout this case plaintiff has professed that her 
career goal was and is to become a Price Waterhouse partner. 
(Tr. 118; Complaint 1 16; Plaintiff's Answers to 
Interrogatories, Nos. 5 & 6; Def. Exh. 53; Pl. Br. 1, 18.) If 
that is so, then there was every reason for her to accept the 
firm's invitation that she stay. She had a substantial and 
challenging job in an assignment expected to run at several 
years.~/ Even without having filed a charge, in the ordinary 
course she might have been made a partner in a later round of 
elections; while this may have seemed a long-shot prospect in 
1983, it was still a possibility that her resignation precluded 
from having a chance of fruition. 
By her decision to leave, plaintiff raised fundamental 
questions about the bona £ides of her continuing interest in 
pursuing a career at Price Waterhouse. She effectively 
extinguished any possibility that she would become a partner in 
33/ At the time of her resignation, plaintiff had served for 
approximately a year and a half as project manager of a $6 
million engagement for the U.S. Department of State, with a 
staff of as many as 19. (Tr. 79.) Plaintiff had direct 
dealings with clients both in the United States and abroad. 
Indeed, despite the unsupported assertion in this Court that 
the partner and Senior Manager positions were "qualitatively 
different." (Pl. Br. 16), there was no evidence that her 
responsibilities as a new partner would have been any different 
than they were at the time of her resignation. She did not 
present evidence or even suggest at trial that she would not 
have continued on the REMS project even if she had become a 
partner in July 1983. 
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the firm, by removing herself from the pool of Senior Managers 
eligible for proposal for admission. Had she remained and 
demonstrated a continuing commitment to the firm, she might 
have been able to change partners' perceptions of her 
qualifications for partnership -- much as she was able to 
change Mr . Coffey's perceptions . 
If plaintiff had stayed, moreover, the fact that she 
had filed a charge of discrimination might itself have enhanced 
her prospects for partnership . The firm might on its own have 
reexamined her candidacy, with heightened sensitivity to the 
issue of discrimination. Such reconsideration might also have 
occurred in the context of EEOC's efforts to seek a voluntary 
conciliatory resolution. See,~, Real v. Continental Group, 
Inc., supra, 39 FEP Cases at 1539. 
Thus, if she had chosen instead to stay, she might 
have become a partner even before her lawsuit was resolved, and 
she and the firm would have had the benefit of her continuous 
employment with the firm and up-to-date knowledge of its work, 
clients, procedures, and people. Even if she became a partner 
only after a reconsideration required by this litigation,/34/ 
34/ Since Price Waterhouse is a partnership , it is important 
to note that reconsideration without discrimination would 
appear to be the outer limit of the relief a court is 
authorized to grant. Thus, Title VII applies only to the 
"employment" relationship, which does not encompass the 
relationship among members of a partnership. 42 U. S.C. 
§§ 2000e(f), 2000e-2(a); Hishon v. King & Spalding, supra, 469 
(footnote continued on next page) 
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she and the firm would have benefited from this continuity, and 
a back pay award would have made her whole. Finally, if she 
(footnote continued from previous page) 
U.S. at 79. Where consideration for partnership is a term, 
condition or privilege of employment, Title VII requires that a 
partnership not discriminate in such consideration. But if 
there has been discrimination, the proper remedy is 
reconsideration without discrimination, not a court order 
requiring that the plaintiff be made a partner. Cf. Pollard v. 
Grimstead, 741 F.2d 73, 75 (4th Cir. 1984) (even though 
employer did not show that plaintiff denied right to compete 
for promotion free of discrimination would not have received 
promotion, plaintiff obtained "full redress" through 
reconsideration for promotion without discrimination). The 
question of the scope of permissible relief did not arise in 
Hishon, because the plaintiff sought "damages 'in lieu of 
reinstatement and promotion to partnership . ' This, of course, 
negates any claim for specific performance of the contract 
alleged." Id. at 72. The pertinent term of the "contract 
alleged" was that the firm would "consider [plaintiff] on a 
'fair and equal basis.'" Id. at 72. 
We are aware of no employment discrimination case in which 
a court has ordered a partnership to admit a person as a 
member. Such relief is inconsistent with the fundamental 
concept of partnerships as "voluntary" associations with 
respect to the relationships among partners. ~, Crane & 
Bromberg, Law of Partnership§ 5, at 38 (1968). Partners stand 
as trustees for one another, subject to the highest fiduciary 
standard of "utmost good faith, loyalty, integrity, and 
fairness in dealings with respect to partnership affairs." 
1 Cavitch, Business Organizations§§ 17.01[1], [2] (1985). By 
operation of law, partners face unlimited personal liability 
for the acts and omissions of any and all other members 
concerning the partnership. ~, Uniform Partnership Act 
§ 15; Tenney v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 409 F. Supp. 746, 749 
(S.D.N.Y. 1975). This is a particularly important aspect of 
partnerships such as Price Waterhouse, which perform important 
"'public watchdog' function[s]" (United States v. Arthur Young 
& Co., 465 U.S. 805, 818 (1984)), exposing all partners to 
potentially enormous liabilities . See generally Ernst & Ernst 
v. Hochfelder, 425 U. S. 185 (1976). In short, partnership is a 
relationship that courts cannot effectively create by judicial 
fiat; Title VII cannot and should not be read as empowering 
courts to grant such relief. 
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were to be unsuccessful in her lawsuit and then decide to 
leave, she would have had a professionally rewarding, well-paid 
experience with a prestigious organization from which she might 
move with more options than she had when she left with a 
pending request for reinstatement. 
Continuation of the employment relationship can thus 
avoid or at least minimize the problems that might otherwise 
exist if the plaintiff prevailed and was entitled to rejoin 
Price Waterhouse.ill/ Moreover, maintenance of an ongoing 
employment relationship can tend to temper the adverse, 
antagonistic nature of the relationship between litigants that 
often arises when the plaintiff in a discrimination case is no 
longer employed by the defendant.fl§_/ 
Where a Title VII plaintiff who claims to seek a 
position he or she was denied stays on the job there is also a 
diminished risk of a disingenuous or insincere request for 
35/ Although professing a reluctance to place her career 
ambitions "on hold," by resigning plaintiff accomplished just 
that as far as her career at Price Waterhouse was concerned. 
Her resignation created a complete break in her relationship 
with Price Waterhouse and its resources. She has lost contact 
with Price Waterhouse partners and staff, and thus has not had 
access to their experience and talents. She is no longer 
familiar with their work, their procedures, or the systems and 
projects of their clients. 
36/ In Delaware State College v. Ricks, supra, the Supreme 
Court rejected the argument that a plaintiff should not be 
required to resort to administrative remedies while still 
employed because it might injure working relationships. 449 
U.S. at 255-56. As noted, a person who files a charge and 
remains an employee is protected by law against retaliation. 
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reinstatement, made primarily as a legal foundation for seeking 
additional damages in the form of front pay in lieu of 
reinstatement. If the prevailing plaintiff has remained on the 
job and demonstrated entitlement to be considered for 
advancement, there is a lessened risk that a court will have to 
address the speculative complexities of such a front pay award. 
A requirement that plaintiff stay on the job if given 
the opportunity to do so also serves the statutory purpose of 
ensuring that plaintiffs mitigate their damages. Thus, a 
plaintiff who stays on the job will only suffer the more 
limited damages that might accrue if the court held the 
plaintiff entitled to a higher paying position, rather than the 
more substantial (but avoidable) loss of the entire salary as 
well. Cf . , ~, Alicea Rosado v. Garcia Santiago, supra, 562 
F.2d at 119. 
avoided.Ll]_/ 
Interim unemployment and underemployment are also 
Plaintiff suggests that there is unfairness involved 
if a person alleging discrimination must "choose between 
pursuing a career or seeking complete vindication under the 
37/ The fact that a person has a pending request for 
reinstatement with a former employer is likely to limit career 
opportunities elsewhere. It is therefore open to question 
whether a plaintiff who leaves a defendant's employ to seek 
other employment has made effective mitigation efforts if, by 
continuing to request reinstatement, the plaintiff has 
foreclosed productive alternatives. It should be noted that, 
after resigning, plaintiff did not pursue a career with another 
company, but instead set up her own consulting company, in 
which she had less diverse projects and fewer available 
resources that she had at Price Waterhouse. (Tr. 118-19.) 
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law," and hence that the law should not be construed as 
requiring such a choice. (Pl . Br. 18-19) (emphasis in 
original). However, the law has already been construed by 
the Supreme Court -- as requiring precisely such a choice. For 
example, if a disappointed job applicant sues but has pursued a 
career elsewhere, the defendant's later offer of comparable 
employment will require a plaintiff to "choose between pursuing 
a career" elsewhere and "seeking complete vindication," for the 
failure to accept such an offer will cut off the plaintiff's 
right to further relief. Ford Motor Co. v. EEOC, supra. 
In choosing not to stay with Price Waterhouse 
plaintiff exercised the right of every Title VII plaintiff (and 
indeed every employee) to pursue opportunities elsewhere. 
Plaintiff's decision to leave was likely influenced by the 
possibility that she would be unsuccessful both in efforts to 
become a Price Waterhouse partner and in her lawsuit. She 
might indeed have found a position that she believed superior 
to that of a partner at Price Waterhouse. If so, she would 
have suffered no harm by choosing to leave. 
Of course, she might not succeed in another venture. 
To allow plaintiff to test the waters elsewhere and yet keep 
alive a continuing back pay or reinstatement obligation on the 
part of Price Waterhouse, without any corresponding benefit to 
the firm, would in effect require Price Waterhouse to insure 
her against any risk of loss in future endeavors. Indeed, 
under these circumstances a district court would exceed its 
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remedial authority in reinstating a relationship that was 
severed voluntarily by the plaintiff. Title VII was intended 
to remedy discrimination, not to provide insurance against a 
plaintiff's mistakes or bad judgment in pursuing career options. 
In the final analysis, plaintiff sought to have it 
both ways: she wanted the unlimited right to pursue her 
asserted entitlement to a continued career at Price Waterhouse 
despite her voluntary departure, and the unencumbered right 
following such departure to pursue a career elsewhere. Giving 
plaintiff that double-barreled career track would disserve 
several important public policies and serve none. Plaintiff 
had every right to leave Price Waterhouse and pursue her career 
elsewhere, as she voluntarily chose to do. She did not have 
the right to a future free from risk,@/ at the expense of 
Price Waterhouse. 
In conclusion, the court below correctly held that 
plaintiff was not constructively discharged, that she 
voluntarily resigned, and that her voluntary termination of her 
employment contract with Price Waterhouse precluded her from 
any damages or prospective relief thereafter. 
38/ Plaintiff's decision to leave, it should be noted, may be 
presumed to have been informed and knowledgeable, having come 
after she consulted with counsel about her claims against Price 
Waterhouse. (Def. Exh. 53.) 
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CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth above, Price Waterhouse 
submits that the district court's decision must be reversed. 
If on the other hand the decision is not reversed, then the 
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STATUTES AND REGULATIONS 
The following provisions of Title VII of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2OOOe et~-, are 
pertinent to the issues raised in the Brief for Appellee -
Cross Appellant: 
42 U.S.C. § 2OOOe-2(a) 
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an 
employer -
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge 
any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against 
any individual with respect to his compensation, 
terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, 
because of such individual's race, color, religion, 
sex, or national origin; or 
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his 
employees or applicants for employment in any way 
which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual 
of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely 
affect his s t atus as an employee, because of such 
individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national 
origin. 
42 U.S.C. § 2OOOe-3(a) 
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an 
employer to discriminate against any of his employees 
or applicants for employment, for an employment 
agency, or joint labor-management committee 
controlling apprenticeship or other training or 
retraining, including on-the-job training programs, to 
discriminate against any individual, or for a labor 
organization to discriminate against any member 
thereof or applicant for membership, because he has 
opposed any practice made an unlawful employment 
practice by this subchapter, or because he has made a 
charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any 
manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing 




42 U. S.C . § 2000e-5(g) 
If the court finds that the respondent has 
intentionally engaged in or is intentionally 
engaging in an unlawful employment practice 
charged in the complaint, the court may enjoin 
the respondent from engaging in such unlawful 
employment practice, and order such affirmative 
action as may be appropriate, which may include, 
but is not limited to, reinstatement or hiring of 
employees, with or without back pay (payable by 
the employer, employment agency, or labor 
organization, as the case may be, responsible for 
the unlawful employment practice), or any other 
equitable relief as the court deems appropriate. 
Back pay liability shall not accrue from a date 
more than two years prior to the filing of a 
charge with the Commission. Interim earnings or 
amounts earnable with reasonable diligence by the 
person or persons discriminated against shall 
operate to reduce the back pay otherwise 
allowable. No order of the court shall require 
the admission or reinstatement of an individual 
as a member of a union, or the hiring, 
reinstatement, or promotion of an individual as 
an employee, or the payment to him of any back 
pay, if such individual was refused admission, 
suspended, or expelled, or was refused employment 
or advancement or was suspended or discharged for 
any reason other than discrimination on account 
of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin 
or in violation of section 2000e-3(a) of this 
title. 
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